Chronology of Tariffs in the Second Trump Administration
This chronology compiles the official tariff actions and announcements (U.S. presidential proclamations, executive orders, Federal Register notices, and foreign government releases) from January 20, 2025 through May 18, 2025. All measures are reported in the order issued.
On January 20, 2025 (the first day of President Trump’s second term), U.S. President Donald Trump issued an America First Trade Policy Presidential Memorandum directing the Administration to investigate large U.S. trade deficits and unfair trade practices. In the following days, the Administration issued executive orders and proclamations to begin addressing these issues.
On February 1, 2025, President Trump signed emergency trade orders (under IEEPA and Section 301) imposing across-the-board tariffs of 25% on Canadian and Mexican goods, alongside 10% tariffs on Chinese imports (later raised to 20%). These duties targeted illegal immigration as well as the flow of contraband drugs like fentanyl to the United States.
On February 4, 2025, President Trump temporarily paused the implementation of tariffs on Canada and Mexico for 30 days following diplomatic interventions from Prime Minister Trudeau and President Sheinbaum, while proceeding with the China tariffs.
On February 10, 2025, the President issued Proclamation 10895 and Proclamation 10896 adjusting aluminum and steel imports under Section 232.
Section 232 Aluminum (Proclamation 10895): This proclamation increased the additional U.S. tariff on most aluminum imports from 10% to 25%, effective March 12, 2025, and terminated U.S. exemption agreements with Argentina, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the EU, and the UK. A Federal Register notice implementing these changes (modifying the Harmonized Tariff Schedule) was published on March 5, 2025. On April 4, 2025, a notice adding two additional aluminum derivative products (i.e. beer, classified under subheading 2203.00.00 of the HTSUS, and empty aluminum cans, classified under the subheading 7612.90.10) was published in the Federal Register.
Section 232 Steel (Proclamation 10896): This proclamation imposed specified rates of additional duty on steel articles (25% on steel from most countries), and directed Commerce to update the tariff schedule accordingly. On March 5, 2025, a Federal Register notice was published implementing these tariff adjustments.
Proclamations 10895 and 10896 significantly expanded previous steel and aluminum tariffs by: (1) ending all country exemptions, (2) phasing out specific product exclusion processes, (3) terminating existing General Approved Exclusions, (4) raising aluminum tariffs from 10% during the first term to 25%, and (5) adding more downstream steel and aluminum products.
On February 13, 2025, President Trump signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled “Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs”, directing the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative to work with Treasury and Homeland Security to provide assessments of each trading partner's non-reciprocal trading practices, including: (1) non-reciprocal tariffs on U.S. exports, (2) unfair taxes imposed on U.S. companies, (3) policies imposing costs on U.S. businesses, (4) exchange rate policies, and (5) other unfair practices. On April 1, 2025, President Trump received the final results of those investigations. The directive established the foundation for what would later be termed "Liberation Day" tariffs, which as decribed below, were issued on April 2, 2025.
Border Tariff Amendments (March 6, 2025): Executive Order 14231 (March 6, 2025) amended the earlier northern-border tariff order. It exempted automotive parts and other goods of Canada that qualify as Canadian goods under USMCA, removing their additional 25% duty. The order also reduced the 25% tariff on imported potash from 25% to 10%. Likewise, Executive Order 14227 (March 6, 2025) amended the southern-border tariffs to exempt U.S.-Mexico-Canada-Agreement (USMCA) qualifying Mexican goods and to reduce the duty on non-exempt potash to 10%. These changes were effective March 7, 2025, and were intended to minimize disruptions to North American auto supply chains. These adjustments have provided temporary relief for certain goods that complied with USMCA rules of origin. Approximately 38% of Canadian goods and 50% of Mexican goods were USMCA-compliant in 2024, with Mexico reportedly planning to increase compliance to 85-90%.
On March 12, 2025, the global steel and aluminum tariffs previously announced on February 10 entered into force. The implementation of these tariffs triggered additional retaliatory measures. Canada imposed 25% tariffs on approximately $20.6 billion of US goods, including steel products, aluminum products, and other goods. The European Union announced plans for tariffs on €4.5 billion of US consumer goods and €18 billion of US steel and agricultural products.
In April 2025 the U.S. imposed broad reciprocal tariffs and adjusted duties in response to trade deficits. It also :
Synthetic Opioid Low-Value Tariffs (April 2, 2025): Executive Order 14256 (April 2, 2025) revoked duty-free de minimis treatment for low-value shipments (valued ≤ $800) from China (including Hong Kong). Effective May 2, 2025, all such previously exempt shipments became subject to the applicable additional duties (e.g. 20% set by the previous EO).
"Liberation Day" Reciprocal Tariffs (April 2, 2025): On April 2, 2025, President Trump signed Executive Order 14257 titled "Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits", declaring a national emergency on account of persistent U.S. goods trade deficits. The order stablished a two-tiered tariff framework: (1) a universal 10% ad valorem tariff on virtually all imports (effective April 5, 2025); and, (2) country-specific "reciprocal" tariffs targeting approximately 60 nations (effective April 9, 2025). Canada and Mexico remained largely exempt from this new round of tariffs, though they continued to face the earlier 25% tariffs imposed in February and March. As of April 10, 2025, the United States has temporarily suspended the reciprocal tariffs for 90 days for all trading partners except China, with which tensions have escalated dramatically during the past weeks. Our team has written a detailed article on these reciprocal tariffs, which can be accessed here.
Chinese Tariffs (April 4–9, 2025): In early April, China responded to the U.S. measures. On April 4, 2025, China’s State Council Tariff Commission announced it would impose a 34% tariff on all U.S. imports (effective 12:01 a.m. Apr 10, 2025). In reaction, on April 8, 2025 the U.S. issued an Executive Order raising the U.S. tariff on the affected Chinese goods from 34% to 84%, effective April 9, 2025. The U.S. order also increased the additional de minimis duty rate (which had been 30%) up to 90%.
Global Trade Retaliation: By mid-April 2025, the United States faced retaliatory tariffs from multiple trading partners. Notably, on April 9, 2025, the European Union voted in favor of introducing a retaliatory 25% tariff on a wide range of US products, including almonds, orange juice, poultry, soyabeans, steel and aluminium, tobacco and yachts, in response to the March decision by the US to impose tariffs on imports of steel and aluminium from the EU. These first wave of EU countermeasures were expected to enter into force on April 15, 2025. However, on April 14, 2025, the EU decided to pause its countermeasures to allow time for US-EU negotiations. The EU reportedly suspended EU countermeasures worth €21 billion of US exports.
For vehicles assembled between April 3, 2025, and April 30, 2026, manufacturers can apply for an offset equal to 3.75% of the aggregate Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price (MSRP) value of all U.S.-assembled vehicles.
For vehicles assembled between May 1, 2026, and April 30, 2027, the offset will be reduced to 2.5% of total MSRP.
According to the White House, these percentages reflect the duty that would be owed when a 25% duty is applied to parts accounting for 15% of an automobile's MSRP value in the first year, and 10% in the second year. Effectively, this structure allows automakers with 85% U.S. content levels to avoid paying tariffs on the remaining imported parts. The Commerce Department was given 30 days to establish a documentation process for manufacturers to receive these offsets. For more information about this tariff adjustment, and its impact on the automotive sector, please refer to this article, in which our team provides an in-depth analysis.
The second Trump administration has rapidly expanded the scope, scale, and legal justifications for tariffs beyond those established in the first term. While his initial administration imposed tariffs on approximately $380 billion in imports, the total under his second administration is projected to exceed $1.4 trillion by April 2025. The administration has invoked various legal authorities, including Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, the National Emergencies Act, and the IEEPA, pushing the boundaries of executive authority in trade policy.
From a legal perspective, many of these measures appear to conflict with US commitments under the WTO and USMCA frameworks, albeit the U.S. administration has consistently invoked national security exemptions. Under WTO jurisprudence, particularly following the December 2022 ruling against US steel and aluminum tariffs, these security justifications face increasing scrutiny from the international legal community.
At the time of writing, there have been no invocations of the USMCA security exception. The text of the USMCA security exception is somewhat similar to that under WTO law, albeit with two notable differences. First, the USMCA version does not require that the party invoking the exception demonstrates the existence of an emergency in international relations. Second, the language of the USMCA exception seems to provide virtually unlimited discretion to the party invoking it as to what it regards as a "security" issue.
As a result, the United States has significantly higher probability of successfully invoking the security exception before a potential USMCA panel, compared to if it were to do so before the WTO tribunals.
The same rationale may apply to the countermeasures that some of the United States' trading partners have adopted (or are considering to adopt) in response to the Trump administration tariffs.
De Minimis Law has substantial experience advising clients on WTO and USMCA rules and related trade policies, including those pertaining to tariffs and national security. For further updates or assistance in navigating these complex trade issues, please contact our office.
Disclaimer:
This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.